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ast spring, policymakers at the Fed
were criticized for moving preemptively
against inﬂation.  This criticism is
somewhat surprising given the recent
track record of the U.S. economy.  In the
past year, our economy has grown about as
fast as it has grown in any four-quarter
period since 1984.  Jobs have been plenti-
ful, and job growth on a nonfarm payroll
basis has been well above long-run trends
in labor force growth.  Meanwhile, unem-
ployment has fallen to a low level, and
inﬂation has remained relatively low and
stable.
By the standards of postwar U.S. eco-
nomic history, one could hardly ask for
better performance.  And yet, in the mid-
dle of this success, we hear calls for a
return to the failed monetary policy
prescriptions of the past.  Many are asking
the Fed to reconsider its successful tack.
They want to replace it with the stop-and-
go approach of the 1960s and 1970s,
policies that proved very costly for this
country in terms of lost jobs and lower
living standards.
In this article, I want to address some
of this criticism and set the record straight
regarding what we have learned about
monetary policymaking in recent times.
First, I want to stress that economic
growth does not cause inﬂation.  A coun-
try can grow rapidly because of real factors
without any consequences for inﬂation.
My second point, which is closely related,
is that the Fed is not against jobs and
growth; on the contrary, it is following
policies intended to allow the maximum
sustainable levels of real activity and
employment.  And, ﬁnally, I want to
discuss ways that we can work to keep
inﬂation low by maintaining a credible
monetary policy.  By a credible policy, I
mean that the Fed sets and announces
clearly deﬁned goals, and it takes action,
when necessary, to achieve those goals.
ECONOMIC GROWTH DOES
NOT CAUSE INFLATION
Let me start with a simple idea:  Eco-
nomic growth does not cause inﬂation.  If
all we know about a particular economy is
that it is growing rapidly, we really do not
know anything about its rate of inﬂation.
The main determinants of economic
growth are real factors like the growth rate
of productivity or the growth rate of the
labor force.  In times of rapid technolo-
gical change, for instance, we tend to see
productivity improvements that allow
greater output per worker.  This can lead
to rapid growth in real output in an econ-
omy regardless of the inﬂation rate.  In the
late 19th century, for example, the United
States was rapidly industrializing and,
indeed, was on the road to world power
status.  Yet the average rate of inﬂation
during that time was negative—actually a
slight 
 
deﬂation.  If growth caused inﬂa-
tion, we would have observed sharply
rising prices during this era.  Instead, rela-
tively rapid economic growth was associ-
ated with deﬂation because money growth
was constrained by the gold standard.
Of course the 19th century is far in the
past, but the idea that growth does not
cause inﬂation is borne out in modern
economies as well.  Around the world,
since World War II, high-inﬂation coun-
tries have grown no faster than low-
inﬂation countries.  If anything, they have
grown more slowly, on average.  And even
a slightly slower average rate of economic
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growth can have a large effect on living
standards.  Suppose, for example, that for
every 3 percentage points of additional
inﬂation, the average growth rate of the
economy declines by 0.075 percentage
points, a rule of thumb consistent with
recent empirical estimates.  Let’s imagine
two economies, one with zero inﬂation,
growing at 3 percent per year, and an iden-
tical second economy with 3 percent
inﬂation, which, by our rule of thumb,
grows at only 2.925 percent per year
because of the higher inﬂation.  It doesn’t
sound like these economies are very
different.  But if we follow them for 30
years, we ﬁnd that living standards in the
economy with higher inﬂation have been
eroded by more than 2 percent.  Is this a
large number?  I think it is.  In terms of
national income in the U.S. economy
today, it would be about $170 billion, or
just under $1,250 for every worker cur-
rently in the civilian labor force.
That growth does not cause inﬂation
has been widely recognized in economics
since the 18th century economist and
philosopher David Hume wrote his famous
tract, Of Money, more than 200 years ago.
Hume’s reasoning was fairly straightfor-
ward.  All of economic theory is based on
relative prices:  People trade off apples
against oranges and computers against cars.
Their decisions are based on the nature of
these tradeoffs.  Prices are expressed in the
relative form, “How much chicken do I
have to give up to obtain a steak?”
In fact, the idea of inﬂation, a general
rise in the level of prices, does not even
enter into the standard theory until money
is considered.  Why?  Because all relative
prices cannot increase at the same time.  It
is only the introduction of money, a com-
mon medium of transactions, that creates
the possibility of inﬂation.  If, for conve-
nience, all prices are expressed in terms of a
paper currency, as they are today, then all
the money prices of goods and services can
rise at once if the amount of currency in cir-
culation is expanded rapidly enough.  Thus,
monetary systems can produce inﬂation.
This is the basis for the assertion that inﬂa-
tion is a monetary phenomenon.  The logic,
reexamined repeatedly by generations of
economists, is ironclad, in my view.
But ironclad logic does not always
translate into simple policy prescriptions.
The exact connections between money
growth and inﬂation can be hard to trace.
There are numerous problems in mea-
suring what we mean by money, and for
that matter what we mean by inﬂation.  In
part because of these measurement pro-
blems, we do not fully understand how
short-term monetary growth rates get
translated into short-term price move-
ments.  For longer-run price movements,
however, the evidence across countries is
clear:  Persistently high rates of money
growth, however deﬁned, translate into
persistently high rates of inﬂation.  This
longer-run evidence is comforting, in that
it helps validate the monetary theory of
inﬂation, but it is not very helpful to those
who must decide what monetary policy
actions should be taken this month or the
next.  Still, problems in identifying exact
connections between money growth and
inﬂation over relatively short periods of
time should not cause us to neglect the
fundamentals of inﬂation.
It follows from my discussion that any
effects of the real economy on inﬂation
must be temporary.  But temporary inﬂa-
tion is by its very deﬁnition of less concern
to monetary policymakers; if it is tempo-
rary, it requires no policy action because it
will dissipate of its own accord.  It is mone-
tary inﬂation that policymakers must
worry about, because monetary inﬂation is
caused by the central bank and can be
eliminated only by the central bank.
Certainly many countries around the
world have had serious problems with
monetary inﬂation, quite independent of
anything occurring on the real side of their
economies.  Some countries in Latin Amer-
ica have had average inﬂation rates in the
postwar era well in excess of 50 percent
per year; many countries in Europe and
elsewhere have struggled with double-digit
inﬂation for years.1 These persistent inﬂa-
tion rates are no accident.  They are a mat-
ter of a fairly simple policy choice by the
central banks of these countries—theFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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choice to tolerate a high inﬂation rate.  In
contrast to these countries, we in the Uni-
ted States are lucky:  We have had inﬂation
of around 3 percent for nearly the whole of
the current expansion.  But this 3 percent
is an entrenched, monetarily-induced
inﬂation which is not going to go away
unless the Fed takes speciﬁc action to
eliminate it.
THE FED IS NOT “AGAINST
JOBS AND GROWTH”
Of course, taking action to move the
monetary inﬂation rate lower is controver-
sial.  Many are concerned that we will
restrain the economy from its full growth
potential if we move to a lower inﬂation
rate.  Indeed, a surprise attack on inﬂa-
tion—a “slam-on-the-brakes” disinﬂation
policy—might well have such an effect.
But an organized, well-publicized, and
fully expected policy move toward a stable
price environment should pose no danger
to the real economy.  Such a change would
allow markets, consumers, and businesses
sufﬁcient time to plan for the new environ-
ment.  In fact, planning ahead and announ-
cing intentions allows markets to act in
ways that reinforce the announced plans.
For instance, a credible policy announce-
ment today that we plan to lower inﬂation
by a certain amount over a certain time
period might enter into tomorrow’s labor
negotiations or government budgetary plan-
ning, allowing those processes themselves to
help bring about the lower inﬂation.  Most
macroeconomists agree with this position:
It is the unanticipated or surprise compo-
nent of a change in policy that causes
economic turmoil, not the deliberate, well-
publicized effort I have in mind.
Far from being against jobs and
growth, the Fed’s inﬂation-ﬁghting policy
maximizes our living standards over the
long run.  That is why I am suggesting that
the Fed should do its utmost to provide a
stable price backdrop for the economy,
allowing the price system to work as
efﬁciently as possible.  After all, we want
the prices in the economy to reﬂect funda-
mental economic value.  This allows
people and businesses to assess economic
opportunities more accurately and make
the best economic decisions.  There is no
reason to confound the purpose of the
price system by introducing inﬂation.
Otherwise, price changes in goods and ser-
vices always have to be examined from two
sides: “How much of the price change is
due to inﬂation, and how much is a real
signal about a change in economic value?”
Inﬂation merely complicates the signals
sent by the price system.
Taking the risk of higher inﬂation is
not just a matter of confusing price sig-
nals.  Higher inﬂation also interacts with
our nominally based tax system, especially
with taxes on capital, to create large distor-
tions.  And higher inﬂation causes people
and businesses to waste resources in trying
to economize on their money holdings.  A
good deal of research suggests that these
costs are substantial.  To make matters
worse, the risk of higher inﬂation creates
uncertainty, which also exacts costs,
including an inﬂation risk premium in
interest rates.
A simple decomposition of interest rates
on government securities will help illustrate
the problem.  The return on a government
debt instrument of a given maturity can be
thought of as having three components:
First, there is a real component, which com-
pensates lenders for the use of their money.
Second, there is an expected inﬂation com-
ponent, which compensates lenders for the
loss of purchasing power of their money over
the time period involved.  And, ﬁnally, there
is an inﬂation risk premium, which compen-
sates lenders for taking the risk that inﬂation
might be higher than they expected at the
time of purchase.
Attempting to estimate the size of
these three components requires sophisti-
cated econometric analysis and, even in
the best of circumstances, it involves sub-
stantial imprecision.  But it is useful to
consider two periods during the postwar
era in the United States when inﬂation was
comparatively low and stable.  The ﬁrst
period extended from 1960 through 1965.
During these years, inﬂation was between
11/2 and 2 percent, and the 10-yearFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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tion that real interest rates do
not change very much over
long periods of time.  Actually
measuring real interest rates is
a difﬁcult task.  One attempt
using commodity own rates of
return is reported by Cornell
and French (1986).
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Treasury note was trading to yield around
4 percent.  Most analysts think monetary
policy had considerable credibility at that
time, so  inﬂation risk was not a large
factor in interest rates.  To the extent
investors expected inﬂation to continue at
11/2 to 2 percent per year, the notes were
priced for a real yield of 2 to 21/2 percent.
Now contrast this with the years 1991
through the present.  Inﬂation has been
near 3 percent during this period, and
according to surveys, investors expect it to
stay at about that level.  But the 10-year
Treasury note has traded in a range
between 6 and 8 percent.  If the notes are
priced to yield a real return of 2 to 21/2
percent, the inﬂation risk premium may be
anywhere from 1/2 to 21/2 percentage
points.2 This is substantial, and I think it
is well worth our time to consider ways to
eliminate it.
A lower inﬂation risk premium is pos-
sible if we follow a disciplined policy to
move inﬂation lower and keep it lower in a
credible way.  But, particularly against the
backdrop of external pressure, it is not sur-
prising that ﬁnancial markets worry that
the Fed will instead allow inﬂation to
move higher, as it did in the 1970s—that
we will allow the inﬂation genie out of the
bottle, so to speak.  And if that happens, it
may be a difﬁcult and painful process to
get inﬂation back to where it is today.
CREDIBILITY: HOW TO KEEP
INFLATION LOW
Our critics notwithstanding, I think
most economists and policymakers agree
with the assessment of inﬂation that I have
given so far.  Because there has been wide-
spread consensus since the early 1980s
that the U.S. inﬂation rate should not be
allowed to accelerate, we have had a fairly
successful run of policy.  This is especially
the case in the current six-year-old expan-
sion, during which inﬂation has been
extraordinarily low and stable. The Federal
Reserve’s monetary policy over the last 15
years is essentially a success story:  We
have made great strides against inﬂation
since the early 1980s, mostly to wide
acclaim.  I think it is important to
remember it hasn’t always been this way.
I am afraid the Fed, and many other
central banks, got into a trap in the 1960s
and 1970s.  Beginning in the early ’60s, the
Fed sought to encourage a higher level of
economic activity by keeping interest rates
artiﬁcially low.  For a time, output rose
while inﬂation stayed low.  The money
supply, however, began to grow at an
accelerating rate, and by 1965 inﬂation
had begun to rise.  In response, the Fed
tapped on the brake, causing the money
supply growth rate to drop sharply and the
inﬂation rate to dip.  But tight money
increased interest rates and reduced the
ﬂow of credit.  The Fed responded by
releasing the brake and pushing down on
the accelerator once more.  As a result, the
money supply expanded sharply and inﬂa-
tion accelerated.  This stop-and-go cycle
was repeated once again toward the end of
the ’60s and became a well-entrenched pat-
tern in the ’70s.  The economy lurched
from recession to recession, and each
recession was followed by an expansion
with a higher rate of inﬂation—and a
higher rate of unemployment—than the
previous one.
I suspect that many of you have
painful memories of the late ’70s and early
’80s.  It was a dark period for our econ-
omy.  High inﬂation, 20 percent interest
rates, and a steep recession bankrupted
many farmers and business people and
sowed the seeds of the S&L debacle.  The
experience surely showed the danger of
letting inﬂation get out of hand.  The
policy failures of the 1970s sprang from
the mistaken notion that monetary policy
can be effectively used to manipulate
growth in output.  However, this view that
monetary policy could “ﬁne-tune” econ-
omic activity turned out to be a mirage.  It
can be argued that such ﬁne-tuning made
things worse.  An erratic monetary policy
—one that steps on the gas today only to
brake tomorrow—is more likely to exacer-
bate ﬂuctuations in real output than it is to
reduce them.
The more successful policy involves
watching inﬂation trends carefully andFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
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acting pre-emptively to stave off incipient
inﬂationary pressures.  Many of the Fed’s
critics comment dryly that the Fed has
been “excessively” concerned about inﬂa-
tion during the current expansion.  But
they’re missing the point:  The success of
the FOMC’s policy has been that the Fed
has moved with enough agility to keep
inﬂation at bay.  Low and stable inﬂation is
no accident; indeed, it is the result of good
policy.  One cannot analyze the inﬂation
outcomes independently of the policy
regime that produced those outcomes.  In
addition, low and stable inﬂation has
turned out to be perfectly compatible with
relatively strong growth in output and low
unemployment.  I am not saying this can
go on forever—I am sure that the business
cycle will continue to buffet our economy
—but to those who argue that low inﬂa-
tion has been constraining growth or
raising unemployment, I beg to differ.
The forward-looking aspect of Fed
policymaking has been essential to the
success in keeping inﬂation low during the
past six years.  The Fed’s pre-emptive pol-
icy moves during the current expansion
have marked an important departure from
the backward-looking policies that got us
in hot water in the past.  Simply put, the
FOMC must, over time, keep monetary
expansion in line with real growth to
maintain stable prices.
HARD LESSONS LEARNED
I have tried to emphasize some of the
hard lessons we have learned about mone-
tary policy over the postwar era:  Inﬂation
is not a road to prosperity; economic
growth is ultimately determined by real
factors outside the control of monetary
policy; and backward-looking, stop-and-go
policies cause economic pain without gen-
erating any offsetting economic gain.
I think many will agree with me that
these have been important lessons.  But
perhaps in this era of good times, it is
tempting to label the Fed as excessively
worried about the reemergence of
inﬂation.  Some critics imagine that
because inﬂation is relatively low and
stable, it has no potential to rise again,
even if we return to the policies of the
past.  In short, the temptation is to forget
which policy regime has been successful in
providing the backdrop for our relatively
prosperous situation today.
In my view, these temptations
represent dangerous thinking for U.S. mon-
etary policy.  Critics who suggest that the
Fed is “against jobs and growth” are not
helping to make better monetary policy or
improve U.S. economic performance.  A
nation cannot inﬂate its way to prosperity.
Creating nominal assets—in effect, printing
more money—does nothing to improve
living standards or create jobs, and in fact
simply feeds inﬂation, which must then be
undone at a later date.  I recommend that
we stick with the policies that helped bring
us to the current point of prosperity.  The
Fed needs to make careful inﬂation fore-
casts and act pre-emptively when necessary
to head off inﬂationary pressures.  The ben-
eﬁts of a forward-looking, anti-inﬂation
policy are clear, and such policies will con-
tribute to continued economic success.
Indeed, a stable price backdrop is the best
contribution monetary policy can make to
the U.S. economy.
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